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Abstract

Psychiatric practice is at a critical juncture in its evolution. Its identified model for
understanding the complexity of individuals and their conditions has been the biopsycho-social-spiritual model since it was first proposed nearly half a century ago. In
practice, this construct is being challenged by a biomedical model which asserts all
psychiatric conditions can be reduced to either neurotransmitter or gene-based causation.
We explore how models are used in science to approximate larger reality, with a focus on
Systems Theory, which is the philosophical foundation for the bio-psycho-social-spiritual
model to describe why this model is necessarily more complete than the biomedical
model. Several examples are presented to illustrate the practical limitations of the
reductionist biomedical model and illuminate the impact of its narrow lens upon the
assessment and treatment of patients. We argue that the biomedical model is inadequate
as it prevents empowerment of the individual and it fails to recognize top-down
causation, which are two identifiable strengths of the bio-psycho-social-spiritual model.
Key Words: biopsychosocial, biomedical, psychopharmacology, psychiatry
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Introduction
Psychiatry has moved through a series of three philosophical phases of
development since its infancy. The first phase was largely focused upon psychodynamic
principles in the form of psychoanalysis and psychodynamic therapy, as elucidated by
Freud and his theories related to the unconscious (Freud S., 1965). The benefits of this
paradigm included depth, understanding, and meaning imparted through symptoms. The
weakness of this model was that treatment interventions were limited in severely ill
patients suffering from psychotic symptoms, and observations that insight alone did not
necessarily result in behavioral change (Prochaska & Norcross, 2018).
By the mid-1950’s, the advent of biological psychiatry created the second
developmental phase. This began with the observation that certain chemical compounds,
like Reserpine and later Thorazine, had remarkable abilities to alter perceptions, emotions
and behavior (Ramchandani et al., 20006). Strengths of this model included an emerging
biological understanding of psychiatric symptoms and an increasingly targeted method of
reducing debilitating symptoms. The weakness of this model was a lack of appreciation
that symptoms may have meaning for the patient beyond biological events (Ross & Pam,
1995).
These two foundational models of human experience and suffering were
historically in direct conflict. The psychological model argued for top-down causation
(meaning and insight leading to eventual biological change), while the biomedical model
argued for a bottom up causation (changing biological conditions for symptom relief)
(Rocca & Anjum, 2020) (Kendler & Woodward, 2021).
The third phase in psychiatry was an attempt to resolve the dichotomous thinking
of symptoms being primarily biological or psychological. It made efforts to integrate the
psychotherapeutic and biomedical approaches into a more inclusive model. This model
began in the 1960’s and was initially referred to as the bio-psycho-social model (Engel,
1977). It was later modified into the bio-psycho-social-spiritual model to include yet
another facet of human experience.
During the 1990’s, prominent leaders believed that a means of increasing access
to mental health treatment was socially desirable. (Kessler et al., 2005) They argued this
would be best achieved by reducing stigma and introducing the metaphor that equated
psychiatric illness with medical illness (Chakravarty, 2011). This “medicalization” was
not without costs, however. An unfortunate side effect from this perceptual shift has
been that patients, families, and clinicians fall short in ascribing meaning to symptoms,
diagnoses, and life because they have been reduced to biological processes alone. This in
essence is a drift back towards biomedicalism, placing psychiatry in the unfortunate
position of suggesting that suffering lacks the capacity for meaning – a highly
questionable conclusion for a field that was originally focused upon meaning as the
instrument of therapeutic change.
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The bio-psycho-social-spiritual model remains the predominant conceptual model
taught in psychiatry training programs and is referenced in textbooks of general
psychiatry (Pies, 2016). The model is articulated as a standard of assessment throughout
the United States and Europe and serves as a foundation for understanding child and
adolescent interactions, including family, peer and societal influences on both behavior
and development (White, 2005). In the specialty of child and adolescent psychiatry as
well as general psychiatry, a focus on biology alone cannot account for the multi-layered
intricacies of an individual’s life and is too narrow a lens for the creation of
comprehensive treatment planning.
The history of purely biological explanations for complex psychiatric conditions
has often fallen short of being complete. Proponents of biological “cures” touted
practices such as ice baths, insulin shock therapy, pre-frontal lobotomies, removal of
teeth, and aberrant applications of ECT in earlier eras of psychiatric treatment (Caruso &
Sheehan, 2017). Any fair examination of the attempted cures in retrospect would
conclude they caused as much harm as good. More modern versions of this narrative,
such as Dr. Peter D. Kramer’s (1994) suggestion in “Listening to Prozac” that enough
serotonin in the brain sufficient to cure to everything from depression to borderline
personality, falls short of the more complex realities of the lives of patients. Although
there are likely elements of the biological model which accurately represent aspects of a
condition, the model has not proven as effective in healing individuals as the original
proponents claimed (Ross & Pam, 1995). We suggest that the limitations of the
biomedical model in psychiatry simply cannot account for all levels of the experience of
the individual. Our aim is not to refute the biological model, as the biology is one element
within the richer description available in the bio-psycho-social-spiritual model; but rather
to assert that the biomedical model is necessarily incomplete in comparison to the larger
model. This incompleteness then reduces therapeutic understanding and therapeutic
choice.
As many clinicians move philosophically towards biomedicalism, the risk that
psychiatry may become a subsidiary of neurology becomes a major concern. One
solution to this identity diffusion is to advocate for a higher value of physician-delivered
bio-psycho-social-spiritual assessment and treatment. Re-focusing our field upon the rich
bio-psycho-social-spiritual model over a purely biomedical model would redefine the
scope of our field for future generations of psychiatrists and patients.
Philosopher of science, Sir Karl Popper, noted that the basic assumptions of
scientific models must be reexamined over time and modified to match reality (Popper,
K. R., 1959).We propose that psychiatry is at such a juncture requiring self-examination
(Ross & Pam, 1995). The increasingly common standard of brief “medication check”
visits is an implicit and insidious confirmation demonstrating support of a narrow
biomedical view. This is positively reinforced by an insurance industry focused on
productivity and profit rather than on patient care. As substantial subgroups within
psychiatry appear to move more towards simple psychopharmacology in daily practice,
what will distinguish psychiatry from care provided by psychiatric nurse practitioners and
physician assistants who also prescribe medications at a lower cost? In terms of patient
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care, what is being lost as the larger understanding shrinks into biomedicalism? How
does the loss of depth and meaning affect the understanding of an individual? What tools
are lost to the clinician, when the scope of interventions shrinks to the purely
pharmacological?
To explore these questions and argue for a more inclusive model of psychiatry,
we will examine how we make models of the world and what the two prominent models
suggest about psychiatric care.
Models of the World
Immanuel Kant lamented in his book, “Critique of Pure Reason,” that it is
impossible to know anything “in and of itself” (Kant, I., 2003). Rather, we are trapped
within ourselves, looking out at objects in the world that can be measured but not truly
known (Kant, I., 2003). His reference leads to the conclusion that we cannot understand
the complexity of the world as a whole, and therefore we must simplify our observations
by creating models which are simpler than the complexity of the world.
A good model simplifies enough to reasonably describe and potentially predict
but will always lack completeness (Korzybski, A., 1941). The simplification of any
observed phenomena, including a patient or their symptoms, requires the breakdown of
the whole into a simplified model in order to make sense of the larger information set
(Lezotte, D. & Scheinok, P.A., 1981). One simplification of this nature is a diagnosis
based upon an agreed set of symptoms, such is as articulated in the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual (DSM), published by the American Psychiatric Association. However,
no model, irrespective of how complete, will approach the complexity of life. If the
model was as complex as life, it would no longer simplify the world enough to be useful.
Alfred Korzybski (1941) created the field of General Semantics on this observation.
When describing the concept of models, Korzybski emphasized that a “map is not the
territory it describes” (Korzybski, A., 1941). All of the descriptions, diagnoses, and
systems of treatment within psychiatry [and mental health more generally] are models,
including the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual.
Use of the diagnostic criteria sets is an example of how psychiatry has created an
imperfect framework in classifying individual conditions, leading to a cookbook-like set
of prescriptions and interventions. However, no two individual patients who fulfill a
diagnostic criteria set for Major Depressive Disorder from the DSM are identical, nor do
they necessarily respond to the same treatment. For individual patients, the map of
options must be far more expansive. Treatment could include psychopharmacological
interventions for one individual but for another, the possibilities could include
interventions such as cognitive behavioral therapy, EMDR (eye movement
desensitization and reprocessing) therapy for trauma, changing social environments,
exercise, or contemplative practice. The simplification provided by the diagnostic model
allows for general assumptions and communication between providers, but specific
interventions require more attention to individual patient needs.
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Mathematician Kurt Gödel discovered a logical proof that no model has the
capacity to be both complete and consistent (Nagel et al., 2008). Gödel’s incompleteness
theorem proves that there exists no possible set of rules and no set of modeling conditions
that can correctly and completely identify all truths within any system (Nagel et al.,2008).
Hoffstader and Nagel opine his work demonstrated the “chasm between the true and the
provable” (Nagel et al., 2008). Gödel’s work in formal logic is another demonstration that
models cannot completely represent that which they are modeling, quite in congruence
with the observation of Kant and Korzybski.
An example of complexity in models is evident in computer-generated games.
Pong, for instance, was the first computer game that represented table tennis: a simple
element resembling a two-dimensional ball clicked between opposite ends of the
television screen. Although revolutionary at the time, its simplistic rendering has made it
an historical amusement. Newer technology has allowed for simulations that model
photorealism for roleplaying games and training for pilots in flight simulators. Modern
simulators are now being tested in psychiatry through means of virtual reality systems for
the treatment of phobias and PTSD with positive results (Kothgassner O.D. et al., 2019)
(Reger, G.M. et al., 2016). The usefulness of these systems is in the detail and complexity
they bring to the experience of the patient working through past trauma. The simplicity
of Pong would not suffice for effective treatment.
We would argue that the biomedical approach to modeling human experience is
roughly equivalent to Pong in completeness of modeling, whereas the bio-psycho-socialspiritual model of assessing human experience is more closely aligned to the
completeness of a virtual reality experience. Why then, is the field of psychiatry so
engaged in focusing on models of individuals that are metaphorical equivalents of Pong?
This idea is demonstrated in Figures 1 and 2. Note, in Figure 1, biomedicalism is
the only element of explanation for what is a substantially larger field of information.
From within the model of biomedicalism, it becomes necessary for the biomedicalist to
conclude they are accurately describing the patient and the psychopathology with a
degree of completeness not actually possible. This is Pong in action. The elements of the
bio-psycho-social-spiritual model, as noted in Figure 2, also do not contain the entirety of
detail about the patient or the psychopathology. Nevertheless, by logical necessity, it at
least describes a larger cross section of reality than the biomedical perspective, making it
a more complete and, thereby, more accurate model of experience on that basis.
As a concrete example, a quick overview of the model of dreaming is instructive.
From the dreamer’s perspective, the dream appears and feels like a complex world full of
interaction and potential meaning, which leads the dreamer to both report and describe
dreams as a narrative sequence or story. Dream material may be associated with deeply
complex emotional responses and ethical choices, or simple residue from the day.
Clinically, as observed by all four authors, patients are often quite interested in what their
dream might mean. From a biomedical model, the dream is considered a random firing
of neurons or potentially a means of housekeeping neural connections (Crick, F., &
Mitchison, G., 1983). This biomedical view cannot account for the experiential
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observation that dreams follow narrative sequences for the dreamer and does not account
for the possibility that meaning could be derived from exploring the dream content (Nir,
Y & Tononi, G., 2009). A cognitive behavioral model of dreaming has not been fully
articulated because the phenomenon of dreaming is thought to derive from a level of the
mind that does not exist within cognitive theory (Freud, S., & Strachey, J., 1965). The
psychodynamic model of the dream makes its exploration the “royal road” to making the
unconscious conscious by exploring themes of emotions and meaning. With this
example of various models of dreaming simplifying the larger reality of the dream
experience, a clinician’s chosen model of understanding would influence how symptoms
are interpreted and filtered in a therapeutic session, and even if the dream were discussed
at all. The dream exists for the dreamer, however, irrespective of the clinician’s model of
understanding dream phenomenon.
This brief examination of how models bring both simplicity and understanding
requires focus into the way science uses its model of observed reality. Is the scientific
model supportive of biomedicalism or is it supportive of the bio-psycho-social-spiritual
model?
Models in Science
Science is a specific method of determining truth through defining models based
on observable reality. Science employs a method, but the conclusions of science also
develop a model of the world. Science creates models for the same purpose described
above, to simplify a larger reality into easily accessible units. As the scientific model
developed, three key ingredients evolved as the method of identifying truth:
measurability, repeatability, and verifiability. Science began to apply this method of
observation to determine interactions in the physical world, where it excelled in
supporting incredible technological progress. This method of observation expanded to
include the universe on a larger scale and subatomic events on a smaller scale.
Science is, therefore, a model that contains a process for assessing claims of truth
within the physical world, specifically with repeatable observable phenomena. However,
it is not a perfect means of defining what is real versus unreal. The danger of equating
scientific models with reality is the loss of the ability to question the model's veracity.
Each of the major scientific advances in the past two centuries has been discovered at the
boundary of where existing scientific models could no longer fully explain observed
phenomena (Kuhn, T., 2012).
Einstein, as an example, used an unexplainable observation related to photon
release from dark objects to suggest photons could be particles rather than waves, which
led to the foundations of quantum mechanics (Einstein, A., 2014). Looking back at many
of the then counterintuitive discoveries in quantum mechanics, this suggestion now seems
obvious. At the time, however, Newtonian physicists were unwilling to “believe” those
findings despite better described physical observations; this type of paradigm change
when new models are required to explain observable phenomenon is articulated by Kuhn
(2012). With the benefit of time, it is clear the model of Newtonian mechanics was not
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complete. The model Einstein created was more complex, and thereby more complete in
its ability to predict the behavior of subatomic particles. Expanding models to higher
levels of accuracy and completeness, rather than shrinking them to the metaphorical level
of Pong, is the means by which understanding progresses.
While science is excellent at describing mechanisms and actions, certain aspects
of existence are difficult for science to describe. For example, science does not model
direct experience from the subjective standpoint of an individual, because such is not
verifiable. Two individuals may observe the same sunrise, with one of them dismissing it
as another morning and another describing it as a deeply mystical experience becoming
life changing. This variance in personal experience is poorly explained by the biomedical
model which would only describe the optic tracts passing through the occipital lobe to
register the stimulus.
Similar limitations are observed in the study of psychotherapy. The focus on
workbook versions of interventions makes them more standardized and are easier to
examine than more spontaneous or intuitive therapeutic interventions. The studies ignore
the intuitive insights, the “aha” experiences, that cause potential core changes in the
individual’s experiences and worldview. Since these “aha” experiences are not
predictable and may occur spontaneously during a therapeutic process, they cannot be
directly studied.
The biomedical perspective's limitations are particularly highlighted in the field of
child and adolescent psychiatry. To attempt to view a child's presentation of
psychological symptoms in a vacuum ignores the reality that children live within
systems. Bronfenbrenner's model of socio-ecological systems describes multiple layers
of interactions, from micro- to macro-systems with early childhood development
(Bronfenbrenner, U., 1981). No two children, even within the same household, likely
experience the same events shaping their development. Yet, the biomedical model
ignores this foundational perspective on early development and takes the view of the
hammer - each individual is a nail and is to be viewed through the narrow lens of the
hammer.
Science has historically been a down-up model in that it draws general
conclusions from observable phenomena, but it stops short of assigning meaning. For
example, it is unable to quantify aesthetic beauty that human beings experience. As an
illustration, consider the measurement of the average sound frequency in a Bach Fugue,
with no appreciation for the musicality, the theme, or the counterpoint. While science is
friendly to the concepts of biomedicalism, within the complexity of a person and their
symptoms, the parts missing from this description provide for a Pong level of modeling.
An updated understanding of our world emerged as necessary in science in general and
was introduced with the development of Systems Theory (Bateson, G., 1972). It was this
advance that gave rise to the third phase of modeling in psychiatry: the bio-psychosocial-spiritual model.
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Systems Theory
Over the course of scientific method from the seventeenth century forward,
certain levels of phenomenon could be naturally observed or measured. However, there
were intermediate steps between observable layers of causation that seemed less clear.
The behavior and attributes of hydrogen and oxygen are reasonably known. Predicting
that water could be the result of combining those two elements, however, is not possible
based upon the physical characteristics of hydrogen and oxygen alone. The level of
observation and qualities of a molecule follow a different rule set than that of the atoms
alone.
Likewise, at the level of a nerve cell, there exist clear definable rules for
predicting whether a cell is likely to fire or not (Sporns, O. et al., 2005). Large
functioning neural nets in which hundreds of thousands of neurons fire in patterns can
also be identified with brain imaging studies. (Sporns, O. et al., 2005). However, there is
substantially less knowledge of the intermediate steps between an individual neuron’s
activity and a functional neural net activity due to ambiguity about how many neurons are
required to make a neural net (Sporns, O. et al., 2005). The processes involved in
changing a neural net size and connectivity are also unclear. Even less connection is
identified between the activation of a particular neural net and the emotional state of the
person at hand.
Gregory Bateson provided an answer to this observational problem within general
science. The answer is termed “systems theory” and is articulated in his book, Steps to
an Ecology of Mind (Bateson, G., 1972). Bateson described that each level of observable
reality has a set of rules that science can study and often model effectively. For example,
there is a distinct set of rules for subatomic particles, another set of rules for molecules,
cells, organs, the bodily systems together, the psychology of how perception occurs, the
social interactions around others, the planet, the solar system, the galaxy, etc (Bateson,
G., 1972).
Within a level, cause and effect is often identifiable. However, between levels of
observation, there is no simple cause-and-effect relationship. The levels of these systems
are instead connected by correlation. A change in one level may correlate with change in
the levels below and above it, but that change is not as reliable or predictable as changes
within a layer of the system being studied. This allows for a semi-connected and semiindependent connection between the observable levels of existence without discounting
the levels above and below (Bateson, G., 1972).
This notion of graded levels of reality can be described in Figure 3 as a simple
layering effect or in Figure 4 as a set of interlacing boxes with the understanding that
within each box is a reasonable level of scientific observation and understanding.
However, jumping from one box to the next is not possible using the same scientific
principles within a level (Bateson, G., 1972). This is congruent with Gödel’s perspective
that, within a single level of rule-set, not all information can be fully understood (Nagel
et al., 2008). In essence, a higher order level is necessary to explain some of the
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happenings within the lower levels. This model also requires that causation move in both
directions: down up, and top down.
To date, Systems Theory has not been successfully challenged as lacking in truth
or usefulness in scientific application. Systems Theory is the theoretical basis of the biopsycho-social-spiritual model within psychiatry. Thus, it can be inferred that this more
inclusive model is congruent with scientific observation which can be measured and
observed, and which enhances the scientific model through correlation between layers, a
key element missing in biomedicalism.
Bio-Psycho-Social-Spiritual Model
Systems theory provided a scientifically compatible answer to the two opposing
movements within mid-twentieth century psychiatry: the psychodynamic and the
biomedical. George Engel, in 1977, proposed the bio-psycho-social model as the best
description of what was being observed in the field of psychiatry (Engel, G. L., 1977).
The bio-psycho-social-spiritual model is a direct outcome of systems theory. As
such, it describes that each person functions on every level and that each symptom or
disease state has some element from each of these levels (see Figure 2 above). As
symptoms affect all levels, this model allows for potential interventions from each of
these levels concurrently to gain greater leverage for treatment. If our only model is
biomedicalism, the other layers lose importance, both in terms of diagnosis and
treatment.
Meta-analyses of psychotherapy ranging through the mid-2000s statistically
demonstrate wide effectiveness of many therapeutic techniques ranging from
psychotherapy to psychopharmacology (Smith, M.L & Glass, G.V., 1977) . Cognitivebehavioral therapy is well studied and acknowledged to treat wide-ranging conditions
from mood disorders to anxiety disorders and, in modified forms, eating disorders and
borderline personality disorders (Miller, R.C. & Berman, J.S., 1983) (Hofmann, S.G et
al., 2012). EMDR has thousands of studies to demonstrate efficacy in removing
traumatic emotion from past memories. No psychotherapy is conceived of in a purely
biomedical model; by the very nature of psychotherapy, treatment is typically explained
using psychological models. If one were to look at symptoms from a purely biomedical
perspective, there would be no purpose or benefit from any form of psychotherapy
because biomedicalism demands bottom-up causation. Based on data showing efficacy
of psychotherapy, this is deemed not to be the case. Each level within the bio-psychosocial-spiritual model affects the levels above and below it; the model allows for both
bottom-up causation, which is friendly to biomedicalism, and a top-down causation,
which is required in psychotherapy (Engel, G. L., 1977).
If we examine the functional MRI scans of the brain that demonstrate brain states
rather than brain traits, there is ample evidence of changes in brain functioning as a result
of taking antidepressant medications for the treatment of depression (Wessa, M. & Lois,
G., 2015), changes in brain functioning when people respond to placebos (Wager, T.D. &
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Atlas, L.Y., 2015), and changes in the brain when people have responded to any form of
psychotherapy (Linden, D.E.J., 2006). Using imaging tools that helped validate portions
of the biomedical hypothesis, the top-down causation in the latter two examples proves
biomedicalism incomplete as a model. In the placebo studies, there is no biological
causation from the substance itself. Thus, the change in brain functioning is associated
with a belief that the pill caused a change, which then causes neuronal changes that in
turn accelerate further biological change.
In the case of response to psychotherapy, the intervention level being introduced
is that of a change in psychology, not a change primarily in biology. It is the change in
psychological perspective that leads to changes in the connections within the neural net,
ultimately leading to changes in biology. This effect is another direct refutation of
biomedicalism. Biomedicalism’s lack of ability to explain any of these observed effects
supports its similarities to the incompleteness of the Pong model.
One model of biomedicalism within psychopharmacology is the biogenic amine
hypothesis of depression and anxiety (Agurell, S., 1981). In short, it explains that
depression and/or anxiety are the result of relative lack of norepinephrine, serotonin, or
dopamine at the level of the synapse (Agurell, S., 1981). The medications used based
upon this model have helped depressed patients for nearly half a century, which generally
cause increases in the amount of one or more of the biogenic amines at the level of the
synpaptic cleft. However, the model does fail to describe exactly how down regulation of
postsynaptic receptors “causes” a patient to feel less depressed. [This is an example of
the inability of biomedicalism to explain the experience of any qualia at all, and is termed
the “Big Problem of Consciousness” best articulated by David Chalmers (1996). It
applies to basic perception, basic experience, and changes in neural functioning. He
argues that there is no biological model which can account for the ability to experience
anything in his seminal work on the topic]. The actual role of serotonin is less clear, as
some studies do not confirm that actual reduction of serotonin in depression (Andrews,
P.W, et al., 2015), but this discussion ranges beyond the purpose of this article.
The biogenic amine model has strengths and weaknesses, like any model of
reality in that it simplifies. The problem begins when the biomedicalist creates the
identity between the biogenic amine hypotheses and depression. At that instant they have
confused what is a model [biogenic amine based causation] from its territory [the state or
experience of depression]. Depression has aspects of experience in biology, psychology,
social interaction, and spiritual elements that are uniquely different for each patient. To
argue it is “only” biomedical ignores the larger complexity present. Equating any single
model with the larger reality is akin to eating a menu rather than waiting for the food
ordered from it. The menu is a modeling of the future food to come, but it is not the
food.
Another danger in equating the model with reality is adding certainty to a model
that may or may not stand the test of time. This may result in prevention of further
scientific inquiry into possible other biological mechanisms using different biological
substrates. Ketamine, as an alternative antidepressant, would not have been considered a
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possible antidepressant based solely on the biogenic amine model. Ketamine is not a
biogenic amine, thus it would not have been considered a likely useful antidepressant
type medication based upon either structure or mechanism of action. Its history was of
being used as an anesthetic which had some dissociative properties. The discovery of its
unique qualities in treating depression was incidental, not planned based upon the
biogenic amine hypothesis. It is now considered an effective antidepressant with a
“unique” mechanism of action (Kraus, C. Et al. 2012).
For the purpose of helping to separate the model of a larger reality from that
reality itself can be accomplished by a linguistic tool which automatically creates a
degree of cognitive separation. The tool to remind reframe our observations to reflect the
presence of a model by means of conceptualizing description using an “as if” form of
statement, even when it is imagined the model is beyond reasonable question. The
following are examples of such rephrasing: Depression contains a biological component
“as if” there was a relative depletion of biogenic amines in the synapse. Depression
contains cognitive elements “as if” one believes a negative cognitive schema of the
world. Depression in some psychodynamic manner seems “as if” it acts as a
psychological defense against rage. In the family system, depression in the family
member is “as if” they are holding the emotions of the group. Depression for some
people acts “as if” a fertile ground for creative thought and writing. Examples are
endless, but by taking the one simple step back from identifying the condition as equal to
the model, it protects the psychiatrist and the patient from identifying an incomplete
model as the only operative element in a much larger reality.
Child and Adolescent Psychiatry and the Bio-Psycho-Social-Spiritual Model
Lev Vygotsky, a Russian psychologist, developed the theory of the ‘Zone of
Proximal Development’ to describe the distance between what the child can accomplish
on their own, and what they can accomplish with the support of a master of the topic
(Rieber, R.W. et al., 1997). His theories of development differ from those of Piaget
(pioneer of cognitive developmental theory) in that Vygotsky theorizes socio-cultural
learning precedes cognitive development. In Vygotsky’s model, infants are born with the
capacity for basic learning; all other development is influenced by internalization of
language and cultural context. Thus, development cannot occur without consideration of
the influences of culture and social context (Rieber, R.W. et al., 1997).
Similarly, Uri Bronfenbrenner’s (an American psychologist) developmental
theories center around the influence of the ecological systems surrounding a child
(Bronfenbrenner, U., 1981). He expands Bandura’s social learning theory to encompass
the multiple layers of an individual’s ecology, and how those layers impact overall
development (Bronfenbrenner, U., 1981). Bronfenbrenner’s model describes a bidirectional influence between the individual and five layers, or systems, surrounding the
individual: the microsystem (family and school), mesosystem, exosystem ( including
extended family, government and school agencies, parents’ economic status),
macrosystem (cultural attitudes and beliefs) and chronosystem (the impact of time over
the course of development) (Bronfenbrenner, U., 1981).
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Both Bronfenbrenner and Vygotsky’s models of development take a departure
from the purely biological theory (Bronfenbrenner, U., 1981). Their models can account
for the differences seen in adopted twin studies, where two monozygotic or genetically
same individuals can be adopted into and raised in different environments. The twin
studies help shed light on the importance of non-biologic factors in one’s overall
development, including development of medical and psychiatric problems.
Children and adolescents are unique beings. Neurologically, their brains are
growing and developing, creating and editing circuitry. Most importantly, children don't
live independently. They are beholden to the layers of systems from their primary
caregivers, to their schools, peers, and community, as described by both Bronfenbrenner
and Vygotsky’s developmental constructs (Bronfenbrenner, U., 1981). Given these
factors, how can we apply a biomedical model in a reproducible fashion to youth who all
experience completely different early developmental trajectories?
Seven Examples of Note
Example 1
Studies have established that if a monkey is removed from his role as dominant
male within a clan and forced into a new clan where he becomes a subservient monkey,
there are massive changes in the biochemistry associated in that male monkey
(Mendonca-Furtado, O. et al., 2014). There are reductions in serotonin and serum
testosterone as well as an increase in cortisol. These measured changes are not created by
a primary change in biological functioning. The dramatic change in social structure
affiliated with the loss of dominance is the social causation which then affects the biology
of the monkey (Robbins, M.M. & Czekala, N.M., 1997). The natural “treatment” for this
condition would be to return the monkey to a dominant status, which was associated with
the biomarkers returning to baseline.
Were a similar circumstance to occur in a human patient, the biomedicalist could
only suggest medications as a potential treatment modality to restore more effective
functioning by means of altering neurotransmitters in the synapse. Biological treatment
could, in fact potentially be an element of treatment for the human patient, but
additionally the psychological and social elements associated with such a massive change
in environment could not be ignored to reach optimal outcomes. And the associated
trauma likely experienced as part of the losses involved could also require examination of
that effect.
This is an unambiguous documented observation of biology changing as a result
of social setting. The change cannot be reduced to a biomedical understanding arising
primarily from neurotransmitter release as a particular etiology. An attempt to do so
would distort the circumstance to make it unrecognizable. This is the error of attempting
to use a simplistic Pong-based model when a more photorealistic model would provide
more data relevant to an assessment and treatment plan.
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Example 2
It has long been argued that meditative states of consciousness allow for the
individual meditator to remain consciously aware as brainwave patterns begin to slow.
For non-meditators, the experience of slower brain wave frequency tends to be limited to
sleep.
Waking brain states typically are in the beta range when we go to work, perform
logical activities, and make decisions. In early phases of meditative practice, they begin
to drop into an alpha brainwave state, which seems to relate to a sense of wellbeing and
relaxation leading to easier learning patterns (Lutz, A. et al., 2004). This initial
brainwave state has been replicated by many scientific studies. If meditative practice
continues, people can begin to experience spontaneous imagery and other experiences
including inner dreamscapes and out-of-body experiences that are consistent with theta
brainwave functioning. The deep formless meditative experience that is absent of content
is consistent with individuals who have remained conscious at delta brainwaves
(Braboszcz, C. et al., 2017).
In 2004 with the introduction of newer technology and selective brain scans of
Tibetan monks practicing compassion-based meditation, an entirely new result was
discovered. The monks demonstrated a specific pattern of gamma brainwaves, in excess
of 40 Hertz, while in the midst of the meditation. This brainwave pattern had not been
observed in any non-pathological state prior to this study. The study provided careful
controls within the group and the only variable that accounted for the intensity and
frequency of gamma brainwaves was the number of years the individual monk had
engaged in meditative practice (Lutz, A. et al., 2004).
Furthermore, the monks were able to turn on and turn off the gamma brainwave
patterns by entering or exiting the meditative state (Lutz, A. et al., 2004). This is a clear
biologically measured example of the creation of novel brainwave patterns based on
purposeful meditative practice. The meditative practice created a biological state of
elevated gamma wave activity through long term practice effects. These data are not
reducible to a biomedical model, even in theory, nor can a biomedical model explain
what would lead a person to engage in meditative practice in order to eventually create a
brainwave state unknown to the brain prior to decades of practice. These findings
demonstrate a level of neuroplasticity that is also not explainable from a biomedical
perspective. The biomedicalist would only have the cognitive set to view these spiritual
experiences as a deviation from the norm. In this example, biomedicalism is not even as
sophisticated as Pong as a model for reality as it would confuse profundity with
pathology.
Example 3
Author GB attended the American College of Psychiatrists meeting in the winter
of 2020 where the first day of the conference was focused upon psychedelic-enhanced
psychotherapy research. Stan Grof (1985) had applied research protocols in the 1960s
using psychedelic substances, psychotherapy focusing on processing experiences as they
occurred, and then following up with the patients to discover that many of their traumatic
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experiences had been resolved in a manner not consistent with traditional
psychotherapeutic processes. Grof described an entire bio-psycho-social-spiritual model
for the transformations he observed in psychedelic-assisted psychotherapy prior to its
being outlawed in the late 1960s (Grof S., 1985).
The researchers who presented at the American College of Psychiatrists (nearly
fifty years post Grof’s work) described the chemical structures of the psychedelic
substances, the half-life, the interactions in the brain, and acknowledged that they did not
sit with the patient throughout any of the transformative experience as therapists were
assigned to that role. They reported on the statistical positive outcomes, the resolution of
symptoms, but nothing on the process.
There is no current theoretical model that would allow a psychedelic substance to
cure depression or any other condition as rapidly as it has occurred in research protocols.
Thus, the curative experience may very well occur at a level beyond the biological.
Looking only at the biochemistry of a psychedelic substance is mismatching in the biopsycho-social-spiritual model, the likely catalyst for change with the causation for
change. It is almost as radical an error as eating the menu rather than the food.
The psychedelic substance creates a change in perception and consciousness, and
that observation and interaction at the psychological level introduces changes in
symptoms, beyond the fact that a psychedelic substance was introduced. Grof (1985)
discovered that he could support similar changes for patients with the use of certain
breathing practices from yogic traditions. He incorporated these breathing practices in
his therapeutic model of Holotropic Breathwork. He never confused the biology of
breathing techniques (and associated changes in blood and brain chemistry) with the
psychological transformation; he realized that the breathing acted as a catalyst in the
same manner that psychedelic substances do.
Example 4
Imagine you are a 14-year-old. You are at the cusp of high school, and you play
on the softball team. It is March 2020. In an instant, school is closed due to a pandemic.
You can no longer practice or play with your team. You have gone from daily
interactions with your friends in and after school to a life confined to your bedroom and
laptop. Instead of normal peer conversations, you have to ‘tune in’ to Zoom sessions,
where your teacher mutes you and your classmates. On top of all of this, your mom lost
her job in the hospitality industry, and dad is nowhere to be seen, it seems. You start to
become irritable and withdrawn, and you wonder what life holds. This was not the high
school experience you expected. You become snappier with your parents, isolate
yourself in your room, stop taking care of yourself as diligently as you did in the past,
because ‘who cares.’ Then one day, Mom becomes concerned. She takes you to see a
psychiatrist and tells the psychiatrist that you’ve become more irritable and isolated. You
have stopped showering daily, withdrawn from other self-care activities, and rarely
engage with the family. A diagnosis of depression is made, and a pill is prescribed.
Our medicalized view of symptom presentation fails the young 14-year-old in this
scenario. From the 1000-foot view, it’s obvious that the impact of COVID-19
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restrictions have led to this adolescent’s struggles. Unfortunately, our ‘symptom
checklists’ and ‘depression rating scales’ fail to incorporate these real-world contextual
nuances that are critical for understanding and addressing the struggles our adolescents
face. Relying on these rating scales alone does an enormous disservice to our patients
and our field of medicine by excluding the practice of absorbing the big picture. The
entire family is likely to be struggling due to the overarching impact of a global pandemic
on the family’s life experience. Empathy, connection, and problem-solving real-world
interventions is the key to improvement - not merely a pill.
Example 5
We summarize a case of two sisters, five years apart in age. The older of the two
struggled with mild anxiety, for which psychotherapy was helpful. The younger of the
two struggled with severe obsessive-compulsive disorder and required both
psychotherapeutic and pharmacotherapeutic interventions. Why was the presentation
more severe for the younger sibling?
Taking the purely biological model again, both have the same parents, both were
products of healthy pregnancies with complete pre- and perinatal care. Both were
breastfed, achieved developmental milestones on time and both had attentive caregivers.
The girls were both born to married, professional parents who were hard-charging
individuals with anxious/driven personalities. In 2008, our economy shifted and the US
entered a recession. These parents lost their business as a result of the economic
downturn, and that stressor (and the ensuing financial stresses) led to a divorce with plans
to share custody of their girls. At this time, the older sibling was thirteen, and the
younger one was eight.
It is LD’s clinical interpretation that the impact of the social and life stresses,
impacting the microsystem (the parents), the mesosystem (the neighborhood, the change
in school from private to public), the exosystem and the overall macrosystem (with
constant stories of economic crash in the news) together contributed to the evolution of
the younger sibling’s worsened expression of anxiety and development of obsessivecompulsive disorder. In the land of child and adolescent psychiatry, a focus on biology
alone cannot account for the layered intricacies of an individual’s life and certainly is too
narrow a lens for the creation of treatment planning. The point of the description is that
with a barrage of stressors and triggers it is nearly impossible to model the full
experience of this child by means of a biomedical explanation only.
Example 6
Consider two young boys referred to the clinic for treatment of ADHD. Both are
nine years of age and meet the DSM-5 criteria for ADHD. However, a more in-depth
assessment of the two boys reveals two very different humans. The first, is the product of
a full term pregnancy, born to supportive parents. He has no siblings, has been raised in a
moderately well-to-do family, and has not been exposed to adverse childhood events.
His dad has struggled with attention, focus, and organization throughout his life, and has
parlayed his difficulties into a creative career that does not demand structure. The other
boy is a product of a pregnancy which involved in-utero exposure to nicotine. He was
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born to a single mom and raised in a chaotic environment with frequent moves,
inconsistent caregivers, and economic distress. When he was a toddler, his mom met a
man, moved in, and had two more children. This man disliked our patient and became
physically abusive towards the young boy. Eventually the boy was taken into protective
custody, and at the time of our assessment, was living with a distant relative.
Two boys, presenting with the same symptoms that meet criteria for ADHD
according to the DSM 5. If we trust the DSM and biological model of assessment,
treatment with medications including psychostimulants would be the easily formulated
plan. However, taking their individual histories into account, it becomes necessary to take
a deeper system-focused view of understanding the patients as distinctly different humans
who arrived at these behavioral difficulties through distinctly different pathways. As
such, they require individualized interventions to address their psychopathology.
Example 7
Consider a 28-year-old male who presented to the VA outpatient mental health
clinic with depression and anxiety. His psychotherapist advised him to consider
medications after a long history of failed trials and fired providers. He had been out of
work and largely inactive for the past ten years. He reported various medical issues
during this time, all of which shared a common symptom complex of debilitating fatigue,
but the cause of which remained mysteriously elusive.
He agreed to start medication and improved to the point of deciding to return to
school full-time. Within the first month of starting school however, he experienced
several alarming physical symptoms, prompting visits to the emergency room, which
again ended in workups that lacked any readily identifiable physical cause. He then
dropped out of school, reporting intolerable anxiety. He saw no connection between his
ambitions, anxiety, and physical symptoms, and instead focused on his continued
frustration with the inadequacy of the medical profession and what he perceived to be
their failure to identify an accurate diagnosis.
Grappling with an entanglement of symptoms that became more and more
disabling, with careful questioning he was able for the first time to construct a connection
between his anxiety and the frequency of emergency room visits. This new realization
opened the conceptual door to explore earlier life experiences. Previously, he had rejected
such introspection, dismissing it as “complaining” and written off as “irrelevant”
because, as he put it, “I knew what I signed up for.” He then identified the seminal
moment in boot camp, where after being injured one day, he was allowed to sit out the
remaining training exercises. Prior to this injury he had been a standout and model
recruit. He recalled anxious doubt about his ability to sustain such efforts long-term.
Through continued collaborative dialogue he arrived at a point of radical breakthrough.
He realized that somatic symptoms functioned as a form of self-preservation in response
to stress. While this unconscious pattern served to protect him in the military, he realized
it later robbed him of the last decade of his life.
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Without the radical change in meaning and understanding for this individual, what
could have moved him beyond his stuck point of over a decade? Meaning was the
controlling force of his predicament and his key to moving towards greater degrees of
freedom. A maladaptive unconscious pattern in self-preservation hastily assembled in a
time of unprecedented stress had lasting consequences well beyond usefulness. A
biomedical viewpoint could not have attended to the interplay between emotional and
physical symptoms and their personal meaning. But beyond the bio-psycho-socialspiritual conceptualization, and in fact to Engel’s further point of emphasis in his original
work: the therapeutic alliance operates as the primary agent of change, a conclusion
shared with Michael Balint, M.D., whose creation of Balint Groups for physicians
focused on the therapeutic alliance as the mechanism of change (Bonomi, C. 2003).
The examples above describe the limitations of the biomedical model within
psychiatry in its attempts to describe and categorize symptoms. There exist countless
other examples. The distortion at the level of diagnosis is then only magnified when
discussing potential treatments. From the modeling perspective, however, psychiatry
must become aware that, should we collectively choose to devolve into biomedicalism,
our model accuracy will develop the resolution of Pong in terms of the whole person.
Then, in doing so, we would lose the richness of our patient’s experiences which could be
far better approached with a more diverse modeling system.
Conclusion
Although psychiatry has been moving towards a biomedical approach in the
description of humans and psychopathology, this model is by necessity a less complete
and thereby less accurate model than the bio-psycho-social-spiritual model designed from
elements of systems theory. The practice models and insurance reimbursement models
have influenced this change in perspective without the necessary self-reflection of the
field. The initial consideration of biomedical explanations to reduce stigma appears to
have unintentionally caused as many problems as it may have solved, the loss of
meaning being a primary casualty in the process. Paradoxically, this loss of stigma seems
to also disempower the very people it was meant to help; placing cures in the realm of
pills, absent deeper understanding of the pathology and individuality, is actually
removing personal power and choice from the patient. In contrast, psychotherapy, in
theory, at least focuses on empowering the individual seeking help as one of its values.
The primary strength of the bio-psycho-social-spiritual model is that it allows for
bottom-up causation to explain how pharmacological interventions may change
psychological, social, and spiritual perspectives. The model also allows for top-down
causation through spiritual, social, and psychological interventions. Bottom-up causation
alone as an explanatory model has failed in general philosophy and logic. Given this
failure at more general levels, it is unlikely to succeed in medicine or psychiatry in
creating accurate and relatively complete models.
There has been no scientific rejection of the systems theory upon which the biopsycho-social-spiritual model was developed, and there has been no reasonable refutation
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of the bio-psycho-social-spiritual model to date. The model is indeed a true hallmark of
individualized medicine, allowing for deeper understanding and treatment of
psychopathology. It is a model that sustains a future for our field. Thus, it is these
authors’ opinions that returning to the larger, more inclusive model is the only means of
restoring psychiatry to its full promise of wholeness in the service of understanding and
helping our patients.
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